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Abstract 
How should scholars study European governance? In this introductory article, we situate our 
genealogical approach in relation to existing research by summarizing key features of the major 
strands of research on European governance, clarifying their primary similarities and differences, 
criticizing their underlying commitment to the development of comprehensive theories and 
articulating the beginnings of an alternative research agenda. This alternative research agenda 
pivots away from attempting to develop a comprehensive theoretical model of European 
governance to one oriented towards investigating the beliefs and narrative traditions that shape 
Europe’s governing practices. We conclude by previewing the contributions to the Special Issue, 
drawing attention to the overlapping themes addressed in each article, namely the influence of 
social scientific rationalities, elite narratives and local traditions in contemporary forms of 
European governance. 
 
Key words: European governance, genealogy, historicism, interpretivism  
 2 
Introduction 
Scholars often define governance in contrast to government; whereas government was about 
hierarchy and bureaucracy, governance is about decentralized markets and networks (Delanty 
and Rumford, 2005: 142–146; Eising and Kohler-Koch, 1999: 3–4; Jachtenfuchs, 1995: 124–
125; Kohler-Koch, 1999: 14; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006: 28). Since the early 1990s, the 
concept of governance has had a significant impact on the study of Europe and the European 
Union (Caporaso and Wittenbrinck, 2006; Hix, 1998; Jachtenfuchs, 2001; Pollack, 2005).  
 Because scholars tend to conceptualize governance in contrast with government, existing 
research has led to vigorous debates about whether member states have lost influence to other 
actors, whether the number of networks has risen, how EU governance affects national patterns 
of politics and policymaking, and how compliance and accountability can be achieved. Although 
these debates cast light on some issues, they suggest an overly monolithic view of governance – 
as if governance can be identified with a new pattern of hollowing-out of the nation-state, 
Europeanization, or multi-level institutions, and as if that pattern is a necessary result of broader 
socio-economic changes (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 143). 
Like previous attempts to theorize European integration (Anderson, 2009; Gillingham, 
2003; Haas, 2004; Milward, 1984, 1999; Moravcsik, 1998), research on European governance 
attempts to develop comprehensive theories of its nature and development. Frequently described 
as “middle-range theories” by their advocates, these theories aspire to be comprehensive by 
proposing to explain some existing pattern of behavior or outcomes on the basis of an underlying 
social logic. We believe such an approach is philosophically misguided. As a result, this Special 
Issue seeks to rethink governance not as a particular state formation, but as a set of meaningful 
practices, informed by various beliefs, concepts and desires. In particular, the five articles focus 
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on the influence of scientific rationalities, elite narratives and local traditions on practices of 
European governance. Such a reorientation leads to the historical investigation of the complex 
webs of belief that inform those practices and the contests that accompany them.  
 In this introductory article we situate the contributions of the Special Issue in relation to 
existing research on European governance. We begin by demonstrating how existing research 
treats European governance as a novel state formation and that existing theories aspire to be 
comprehensive accounts of the nature and development of European governance based on the 
alleged existence of underlying social logics. Then we explain and justify our understanding of 
European governance as set of meaningful practices and how this reconceptualization leads to a 
different research agenda, one that pivots away from attempts to develop comprehensive 
theoretical models to one oriented towards investigating the beliefs and narrative traditions that 
shape Europe’s governing practices. In short, we advocate a shift to historicist explanations of 
ideas and practices, or genealogy. Finally, we summarize the contributions of each article and 
highlight how they exhibit the themes of central interest in this Special Issue: social science 
rationalities, elite narratives and local traditions. 
 
Governance Research 
In the 1990s, governance approaches emerged as a rival to International Relations and 
comparativist approaches to the study of the EU (Hix, 1998; Pollack, 2005: 379–90).i Like 
comparativists, governance scholars were responding to what they viewed as the changing nature 
of the Union. However, unlike comparativists (Hix, 1994, 1998, 2006), governance scholars 
generally did not draw the conclusion that the EU was becoming increasingly similar to national 
political systems. As a result they rejected the tendency to adopt “off-the-shelf” models and 
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theories drawn from the study of domestic politics (Pollack, 2005: 380). Even those scholars 
whose theories were directly inspired by the study of domestic policymaking – for instance, 
Giandemenico Majone (Majone, 1996) – the idea of governance signaled the arrival of a new 
type of political system in Europe. This new political system was distinct from conceptualizing 
the EU as either an international organization or federal government.  
While research on European governance shares a common point of departure – rejecting 
the view that the EU is adequately conceptualized as either an international organization or 
federal government – similar to its treatment in other fields “European governance” is an 
“umbrella concept,” covering a number of different uses (Rhodes, 1996). On this point, we 
depart from other commentators who see governance as a relatively coherent approach to the 
study of the EU (Hix, 1998; Jachtenfuchs, 2001; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006; Pollack, 
2005). Four different uses stand out: multi-level governance, network governance, regulatory 
governance and experimentalist governance.ii Although overlapping in certain respects, these 
four strands of research (1) conceptualize European governance differently, (2) identify different 
phenomena or processes by the term, (3) draw different conclusions about the significance of 
European governance, (4) provide different explanations of why Europe and the EU was 
transformed into a system of governance, (5) make different claims about how governance 
affects policy-making and (6) debate different problems. In our summary of the research, we 
draw attention to these six points of contrast. 
Despite these differences, research on European governance is presented as a set of mid-
range theories that provide comprehensive accounts (or potentially comprehensive dependent on 
future empirical confirmation) of Europe or the EU as a type of political regime or polity (see for 
instance Kohler-Koch, 1999: 14–15). These theories aspire to comprehensiveness by unpacking 
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the essential properties of European governance, explaining the rise of governance as the 
outcome of certain conditions or structures and asserting that the essential properties of European 
governance explain a novel pattern of rule or state formation. In section three, we explain why 
the attempt to produce a comprehensive account of European governance is impossible and 
therefore why the reconceptualization of governance pursued by this Special Issue is justified. In 
this section, however, we simply note that theories of multi-level governance, network 
governance, regulatory governance and experimentalist governance are presented as 
comprehensive accounts of European governance based on the alleged existence of various 
social logics. 
 
Multi-level Governance 
For scholars of multi-level governance (MLG), European integration and policy-making has led 
to a dispersion of authority and influence amongst state, EU and subnational governmental actors 
(Bolleyer et al., 2014; Hooghe and Marks, 2008; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2009: 7–8; Marks 
et al., 1996). The EU polity is “multi-level” in the sense that state actors at various territorial 
levels share authority in the policymaking process. EU policy-making is characterized by 
“governance” because it features “mutual dependence, complementary functions and overlapping 
competencies” (Marks et al., 1996: 372). EU institutions, national and subnational governments 
share authority and influence.  
The transformation of the EU into a multi-level polity is said to result in two important 
outcomes. First, state executives no longer exert sole control over the representation of domestic 
interests or values at the EU-level. European integration has led state executives to lose their 
monopoly on domestic interest mediation to supranational institutions and subnational groups. 
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Second, different levels of government have become dependent on resources controlled by actors 
at other levels (Pollack, 2005). Governmental actors possess different resources, like 
information, economic assets and public authority. Effective policy-making requires bringing all 
these resources to bear on an issue. While scholars of MLG do not deny that state executives are 
important, or even the most important actors in the policy process, because national governments 
are no longer the exclusive representatives of domestic interests and effective policy-making 
depends on contributions by various parties, they conclude that a broad range of public actors 
hold considerable sway in the policy process and outcomes are determined by the 
interdependence of European and domestic levels of government (Jachtenfuchs, 2006).  
Scholars cite a number of factors to explain the transformation of the EU from a system 
of sovereign states into a system of MLG: the changing scale of collective problems, the post-
War expansion of the national policy portfolio and geopolitics, the benefits that are achieved 
through shifting decision-making power to the supranational level, the limited influence of 
individual states due to decision-making rules and the loss of control experienced by state 
executives once supranational institutions are created (Marks et al., 1996). First, governmental 
leaders face functional pressures from the changing scale of collective problems. Where the 
problems are transnational in scope, the most effective level of decision-making is similarly 
transnational. Second, post-WWII states have taken on a much broader range of policies related 
to economic growth and welfare. And achieving national policy goals frequently requires 
transnational cooperation. Third, and relatedly, governmental leaders benefit from shifting 
decision-making to the supranational level. Not only does it allow them to deliver policy 
outcomes voters desire, but it also allows them shift blame onto Brussels for unpopular decisions 
and insulates decision-making from domestic pressures after they leave office. Fourth, state 
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executives have limited control over the activities and makeup of supranational institutions like 
the Commission and European Court of Justice. Combined with the extension of qualified 
majority voting in the Council, individual governments are frequently unable to determine 
outcomes. Finally, European integration occurred at a time when the pressures of superpower 
rivalry encouraged, rather than discouraged, reducing barriers to trade across Western Europe. 
Given these factors, member states share domestic interest representation and policy influence 
with supranational and subnational public actors.   
Research on MLG has addressed the influence of supranational and subnational groups in 
policy-making and the breadth as well as the depth of integration, including variation across 
policy areas. Debates in the study of MLG include the changing role of the state, the extent to 
which non-public actors are involved in decision-making, the importance of networks rather than 
hierarchy in relations between actors, the extent to which authority across governance levels is 
fragmented versus interlocking and the implications of MLG for democratic accountability 
(Bache and Flinders, 2004; Hooghe and Marks, 2008). One prominent offshoot of MLG is the 
study of “Europeanization,” or the interactions between the EU and member states as well as 
third countries. Top-down perspectives on Europeanization address the impact of European 
integration on national institutions, policies and politics. Here the question has been in what 
ways and through what mechanisms does the European level cause changes in member states and 
third countries? Alternatively bottom-up perspectives, address to what extent and through what 
processes do domestic actors upload their preferences over EU policies, processes and 
institutions (Kohler-Koch, 1999; Jachtenfuchs, 2001: 250–251; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 
2006: 38; Graziano, Paolo and Vink, Maarten P., 2007; Ladrech, 2010; Börzel and Panke, 2013). 
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Network Governanceiii 
MLG and network theory share obvious affinities in their focus on the dispersion of influence 
amongst different actors throughout the policy process.iv However, whereas MLG tends to focus 
on governmental actors at different territorial levels, network theory scrutinizes public and 
private actors at the same (“horizontal networks”) or different territorial levels (“vertical 
networks”) (Peterson, 2004: 132). 
According to one prominent definition, a network is “a set of relatively stable 
relationships which are of [a] non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of 
actors, who share a common interest with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to 
pursue these shared interests acknowledging the co-operation is the best way to achieve common 
goals” (Börzel, 1998: 254). A network includes all public and private actors involved in the 
design and implementation of policy in a particular policy sector. Network governance refers to a 
process of governing in the absence of a central authority in which the political arena is 
populated by public and private actors linked together through a variety of resource 
interdependencies (Eising and Kohler-Koch, 1999: 4).  
The transformation of the EU into a networked polity is said to have two important 
impacts. First, the EU is a highly differentiated polity. Across different policy sectors, decision 
rules and dominant actors vary considerably. The processes and actors that shape, say, 
environmental policy (Braun, 2009; Jordan and Schout, 2006) and trade policy (Dür, 2008) are 
quite distinct. Furthermore, European governance is built on top of highly developed subsystems 
that contain their own logics and dynamics. The segmentation of society and the state into 
different governance networks means that political arenas and societal subsystems develop their 
own political logics that are only loosely associated with other political arenas (Eising and 
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Kohler-Koch, 1999: 4). Second, many policy areas are highly technical and tend to be dominated 
by experts. This is said to be especially evident in social and environmental regulation. Policy-
making in these areas gathers together EU independent bodies as well as public and private 
experts. At every stage of the policy-making process – agenda formation, decision-making, 
implementation and adjudication – the Union relies upon committees of officials and other 
stakeholders. (Kohler-Koch, 1999: 24–26; Peterson, 2004: 117–118). 
Explanations of the emergence of European network governance point to five factors. 
First, public and private actors shared the belief that the legitimacy of the European project was 
to be based on functional representation, technocratic regulation and institutionalized 
deliberation. This shared understanding of the bases of legitimate European policy-making 
justified the participation of a variety of state and societal actors. Second, the Commission acted 
as a political entrepreneur in order to strengthen its own influence relative to other EU 
institutions and achieve policy outcomes in line with its preferences. As a result it actively 
recruited economic and social actors to participate in EU policy-making that aligned with its 
institutional and policy goals. Third, to enhance their autonomy from national governments and 
increase their influence in European affairs, subnational groups sought avenues of interest 
representation at the EU-level. One result of this domestic agitation was the creation of the 
Committee of the Regions, which over time gained access to more policy fields. Fourth, in order 
to exert greater influence on decisions that impacted their interests, corporate actors and interest 
associations forged transnational links to lobby in Brussels. And finally, the transformation of 
EU legal acts into a system of supranational law empowered EU citizens to take legal action 
against their governments. The result of these factors was the formal and informal 
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institutionalization of a policy-making process that relies on the actions of various public and 
private actors at different territorial levels (Kohler-Koch, 1999: 18–20). 
Network theorists offer competing accounts of the logic of network governance. Some 
claim that the structure of networks has a significant influence on how members interact, the 
policy-making process and policy outcomes. Although different typologies of networks exist in 
the literature (Börzel, 1998), network theorists tend to argue that the relative stability of 
membership, their openness to individuals and groups and the level of resource interdependence 
amongst actors determine the relative influence of various actors and the substantive content of 
EU policies (Peterson, 2004: 120). Variation in these variables, and thus variation in the internal 
structure of networks, is alleged to produce different outcomes (Börzel, 1998: 254). Others argue 
that the structural properties of the EC/EU like the allocation of competences, formal and 
informal decision-making rules, administrative routines and comitology, alongside 
intersubjectively shared belief systems regarding legitimate political action generate a particular 
system of governance, characterized by state mediation (rather than authoritative allocation), 
mixed motive behavior, novel patterns of interaction and multi-level coordination (Kohler-Koch, 
1999). In either version, variations in the essential characteristics of network governance is said 
to give rise to a novel system of rule. 
Network analysis has been used to explain the relative influence of national or 
supranational interests in instances of bargaining, the role of political advocacy coalitions and 
epistemic communities in bringing about policy shifts, domestic interest mediation in EU foreign 
policy-making (Fischer and Sciarini, 2013), the building of regional cross-border cooperation 
(Perkmann, 1999), the evolution of the EU’s emission trading scheme (Braun, 2009), Cohesion 
Policy and the Common Agricultural Policy. Debates over network governance have focused on 
 11 
the performance of network governance (Schout et al., 2010), the extent to which the EU is 
governed through networks, how European network governance affects national patterns of 
governance and the legitimacy of network governance (Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999). 
 
Regulatory Governance 
For other scholars, most notably Giandomenico Majone, governance refers to a distinctive mode 
of policymaking: the replacement of public ownership, planning and centralized administration 
by regulation as a model of state intervention in the economy and society (Majone, 1994, 1996, 
1999). EU governance, in this view, is regulatory governance, defined as the “sustained and 
focused control exercised by a public agency over activities that are socially valued” (Majone, 
1994). 
According to Majone, statutory regulation by independent agencies is the most important 
form of policymaking conducted at the EU-level (Majone, 1999: 2), encompassing an increasing 
number of policy areas, including consumer product safety, medical drug testing, research and 
technological development, education, tourism, banking and financial services, competition law 
and the environment. Two features of the EU’s regulatory role stand out (Majone, 1994). First, 
the creation of the single European market depended on the internationalization of regulation. 
Through addressing monopolistic practices, providing information and controlling negative 
externalities, EU institutions and agencies– and the Commission above all others – has been able 
to overcome problems of regulatory failure endemic to international contexts and thereby 
Europeanize national markets. Second, because regulation is a very specialized type of 
policymaking, it tends to be dominated by experts and requires high levels of administrative 
discretion. Significant policy-making powers have been delegated to independent institutions. 
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These two features of EU regulation are connected. Expert decision-making insulated from 
political interference underpins the EU’s market making capacity.  
Majone traces the development of the EU into a regulatory state to both general trends in 
public governance and specific factors that influenced the EU.v First, the failure of public 
ownership and the privatization of state enterprises and key industries across Europe led to a 
reliance on regulation to correct market failures, improve the efficiency of the economy and to 
protect the public interest. The role of the state changed from being a producer of goods to an 
umpire of the rules of the game (Eberlein and Grande, 2005: 90). Second, public officials 
perceived a mismatch between institutional capacities and the growing complexity and 
interdependence of social problems. The “policing of financial markets in an interdependent 
world; controlling the risks of new products and technologies to the public; protecting the health 
and economic interests of consumers without impeding the free flow of goods, services and 
people across national boundaries; reducing environmental pollution” outstripped the capacities 
of individual states and were not soluble by old-style command and control techniques (Majone, 
1994). The delegation of policymaking to supranational experts who possessed both the technical 
capability and discretion to respond to an ever changing, interconnected world allowed national 
governments to achieve a level of policy effectiveness they could not achieve on their own 
(Majone, 1996: 4). Third, the EU is limited in its ability to tax and spend. Because the EU’s 
budget is small both in absolute terms and relative to the fiscal capacities of member states and 
dedicated to supporting a few (re)distributive programs (e.g., Common Agricultural Policy), the 
capacity to support direct-expenditure programs was quite limited. Tax and spending activities 
typical of national governments were blocked. Fourth, given the EU’s limited budgetary 
resources, the only way for the Commission to increase its influence was to expand its role in 
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regulatory activities. Regulation was the optimal option because the cost of producing 
regulations was small and the costs of compliance were born by the firms and individuals as well 
as member states who were responsible for enforcement. The Commission’s role was supported 
by export-oriented industries in Europe that had a strong incentive to push for European-level 
regulation to avoid inconsistent and progressively more stringent regulations in EC and non-EC 
countries. Fifth, member states were willing to surrender important regulatory powers to 
supranational institutions because inter-governmental solutions were not credible. Individual 
governments lacked the ability or incentive to verify and enforce inter-governmental agreements. 
Finally, not only did the Commission have the incentive to play a major role in regulatory policy 
but it also had the ability to be an effective policy entrepreneur given the highly talented and 
motivated staff that it recruited and its central role in issue networks. In sum, the rise of 
European regulatory governance was the result of a confluence of factors: general trends of 
privatization, deregulation and regulatory failure in face of growing international 
interdependence, the power-seeking entrepreneurship by the Commission in light of the EU’s 
fiscal disadvantage and support by export industries and state elites that believed regulation 
could be best be handled at the EU-level. 
Research on European regulatory governance has focused on why EU institutions and 
bodies have been particularly successful at acquiring regulatory powers, which actors have had 
primary responsibility for establishing the EU as a regulatory state, explaining differences in 
regulatory powers across issues areas and how to ensure political accountability (Kohler-Koch 
and Rittberger, 2006: 35–36). One particular robust areas of debate is over the extent to which 
regulation is actually Europeanized rather than nationalized (Eberlein and Grande, 2005: 92–93). 
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Experimentalist Governance  
A fourth strand of governance research is the study of experimentalist governance (Caporaso and 
Wittenbrinck, 2006; Eberlein and Kerwer, 2004; Sabel and Zeitlin, 2007; Zeitlin, 2011). 
According to one of its foremost proponents, experimentalist governance is defined as a 
“recursive process of provisional goal-setting and revision based on learning from the 
comparison of alternative approaches to advancing them in different contexts” (Zeitlin, 2011: 5). 
Experimentalism is said to form an “underlying architecture of public rule making in the EU,” 
combining mutually agreed framework goals, subsidiarity in implementation, performance 
reporting and peer evaluation, and periodic revision of goals, metrics and procedures by a 
widening circle of relevant actors. The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) has received the 
bulk of experimentalist attention. 
The EU’s experimentalist architecture is said to be significant in because it contrasts with 
government hierarchy and it permits policy cooperation in areas where binding decisions are 
politically unpalatable. Experimentalism is said to be distinct from hierarchical government in 
four basic ways. First, there exists no clear distinction between policy conception and 
administrative execution. Goals and means are set through a repeated process of provisional goal 
setting and execution. Second, experimentalism is neither centralized nor decentralized, but 
combines centrally coordinated learning with local experimentation. Third, experimentalism is 
neither formalized nor informalized, but “flexibly formalized,” organized by well-defined rules 
and norms that are revised in light of experience. Fourth, compliance is not achieved through 
formal sanctions but on the basis of good arguments regarding why one set of goals and means is 
preferable to another. In the absence of demonstrated success, compliance is achieved through 
self-correction and improvement. 
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The second way experimentalism is said to be important is that it allows for coordinated 
action in areas where the Union lacks legal competence and/or member states are hesitant to 
commit to binding targets or policies because of their political sensitivity. Because governments 
participate on a voluntary basis, it allows them to avoid the public scrutiny and conflict typical of 
reaching agreement over binding commitments (Caporaso and Wittenbrinck, 2006: 475). As one 
form of experimentalism, the OMC was initiated as part of the European Employment Strategy 
to allow for more informal, less hierarchical means of coordinating national policies in the areas 
of employment. The OMC was subsequently applied to other policy areas, including poverty and 
social exclusion, pensions, immigration, education and youth issues (Regent, 2003). 
Explanations of the rise of experimentalist governance point to two scope conditions: 
strategic uncertainty and a polyarchic distribution of power. New developments like the 
globalization of production, transborder environmental effects and technological innovation 
leads to strategic uncertainty amongst political actors about policy goals and means, while 
dispersing influence to a variety of actors. Because actors do not know what precisely they want 
to achieve or how to do so, and because they depend on others for successful action, they are 
oriented toward deliberative problem solving or experimentalism (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2007: 13–
14; Zeitlin, 2011: 5–10). With respect to the development of the OMC, additional factors are also 
cited: the particular problems of factor and product market flexibility under EMU, the need to 
avoid public scrutiny and respect for national differences (Eberlein and Kerwer, 2004: 125; 
Hodson and Maher, 2001).  
Research on experimentalism has explored variation in the effectiveness of the OMC 
across issue areas, its impact on national polices, the interests and motivations of significant 
actors, the extensiveness in its use, its openness to various actors and whether or not it will be a 
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transitional mechanism preparing the way for the transfer of additional competences to the EU 
and away form individual states (Eberlein and Kerwer, 2004: 125–127; Hodson and Maher, 
2001; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006: 36–37). 
 
*** 
Typically, then, scholars conceptualize European governance in contrast with 
government. In doing so, they break from statist paradigms emanating out of IR or comparativist 
research. Where government was about hierarchy and bureaucracy, governance refers to a new 
method, process or pattern of public rule – that is, a novel state formation. Although their 
concepts and theories overlap at times – and efforts have been made to combine various strands 
(see for instance Eberlein and Grande 2005) – definitions of governance vary, as do the 
phenomena they name and explanations of how it arose. Furthermore scholars make different 
claims about the significance of governance, research different questions and debate different 
issues. Table 1 summarizes the primary differences amongst the different strands of governance 
research. 
 
 
[Table 1 here]
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The Ideas that Govern Europe 
While overlapping in a limited way with existing research, the contributions to this Special Issue 
start from different premises about political action. These differences have significant 
implications for research on European governance. Most notably, it leads to rejecting efforts to 
build and test comprehensive theories of European governance and shifts attention to developing 
humanist and historicist explanations that expose complexity, diversity and contestation. In short, 
we advocate genealogical research on the ideas that govern Europe.vi 
We share the belief with other researchers that there exist patterns of governance in 
contemporary Europe, some of which are new. Regulatory provision is a central feature of the 
EU, networks of private and public actors contribute to the creation and implementation of 
policy, different levels of government interpenetrate and so on. Where our views differ 
decisively is over how we should explain these patterns (Bevir, 2013: 66–69). Theories of multi-
level, network, regulatory and experimental governance explain the rise of European governance 
or its effects on the existence of certain social facts. It is presumed that inhering in these facts is a 
social logic that produces patterns of behavior. Theories of European governance present 
themselves as comprehensive, mid-range theories by appealing to the existence of certain social 
facts that exhibit a social logic. To take one example, theories of MLG, regulatory governance 
and experimentalism cite the fact of interdependence as one factor that accounts for the new 
process, pattern or method of governance that they identify. A certain pattern of facts – 
interdependence – are said to explain another pattern of social facts – European governance.  
In contrast, we believe that the aspiration to comprehensiveness and the positing of social 
logics is philosophically flawed. Social facts (like interdependence) or patterns of social facts 
cannot explain European governance. Social facts cannot explain political activity because 
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humans are agents that act on beliefs and desires that are their own. Because humans are agents 
social facts do not contain a social logic that explain some outcome. Rather it is actors’ ideas that 
do the explanatory work, including beliefs about interdependence. Indeed, if theories of 
European governance each capture some of the truth about the contemporary European political 
reality, what they reveal is that political actors have responded to the fact of interdependence in a 
variety of ways, producing a variety of governance practices. Other actors or the same actors in 
other contexts, of course, have carried on as before either unaware that interdependence exists or 
believing it does not require the same sort of response across all settings. The fact of 
interdependence does not explain the new practices of European governance; actors’ beliefs and 
preferences do. The development of a comprehensive theory of European governance is 
impossible because social facts do not contain social logics. 
Because political actors are agents, our theories of European governance should be 
resolutely humanist in form. Candidate theories – that is, theories that in principle might have a 
claim on our allegiance – should be humanist in the sense that they will appeal to the actual 
beliefs and desires of those we study. Patterns of governance practices will be explained by 
reference to the beliefs and desires of those engaged in such practices. A theory of governance 
that appeals to interdependence as a social fact is not a candidate theory – meaning, it could not 
in principle be a true explanation – because it attempts to bypass the beliefs of actors or treats 
actors’ beliefs as resulting from some deeper reality.vii  
Because candidate theories must explain practices of governance by reference to the 
beliefs and preferences of those engaged those practices, this means that research should also be 
historical in nature. Political actors inherit some of their beliefs and the practices those beliefs 
inform from people who have come before them. Beliefs and practices are inherited through 
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what can broadly be called ‘socialization’. As a result, to explain the actions of those we study, 
we should develop historical narratives of how actors came to hold the beliefs and desires that 
they do.  
In our view, then, existing research on European governance is better understood as 
descriptions of general patterns rather than comprehensive theories of governance. But as 
descriptions of general patterns, multi-level governance, network theory, regulatory governance 
and experimentalism need to be supplemented by ideational and historicist explanations. We 
need ideational and historicist explanations of the particular cases that give rise to the broader 
patterns of governance practices in contemporary Europe.  
The focus on the ideas that govern Europe has one other important implication for 
research. It should be more attuned to complexity, diversity and contestation. Existing research 
on European governance suggests overly deterministic accounts of the rise of European 
governance and how it functions. Such an account makes sense if one thinks social facts like 
interdependence have some determinative social logic. But as just argued they do not. 
Alternatively, if one thinks – as we do – that political action is determined by people acting on 
some of their beliefs, then it suggests a much more contingent account of the historical 
emergence of patterns of governance. Given that political actors often hold different beliefs and 
preferences and struggle against one another in the determination of political action, historical 
research will frequently showing how there existed a range of competing programs, drawing 
attention to the contingencies of practices. In the attempt to build comprehensive theories of 
European governance, too frequently scholars play down or ignore complexity, diversity and 
contestation. By contrast, humanist and historicist explanations should give these features greater 
prominence. For instance, in our study of the democracy reforms contained in the Lisbon Treaty 
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we demonstrate that actors responsible for negotiating treaty changes were influenced by a 
number of different “governance traditions” – or ideas about what made the EU legitimate. This 
resulted in different, conflicting proposals about how to improve the Union’s democratic 
character. Because the Lisbon Treaty included reforms that were rooted in different governance 
traditions, EU democracy is a composite of concepts. Had actors mobilized around a different set 
of ideas or if certain ideas had been given greater prominence, then EU democracy would itself 
be different. Our study thus reveals the complexity, diversity and contestation that accompanied 
the democratic reform of the EU. 
In sum, because governance, like all political action, is a practice informed by various 
ideas, we advocate a shift in attention to the concepts, beliefs and desires that actors use to 
govern Europe. Such a focus suggests the development of historical narratives to explain the 
emergence of such ideas and the governance practices that they support as well as greater 
attention to diversity, complexity and contestation.  
 
Summary of Contributions  
The articles in this Special Issue provide humanist and historicist explanations of 
contemporary practices of European governance. In doin so, they explore diversity, complexity 
and contestation. While many different ideas that are used to govern Europe call out for 
attention, the articles focus on scientific rationalities, elite narratives and meaningful practices. 
Each of the articles addresses one or more of these themes. In focusing on scientific rationalities, 
several articles demonstrate the impact of modernist social science on changing patterns of 
governance, such as, for example, the role of behavioral economics in promoting nudge 
technologies. Other contributions analyze the discourses and policies of political elites in their 
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attempts to promote novel modes of governance. And some of the articles explore the myriad 
ways in which local actors have interpreted and thus forged governance practices on the ground. 
In summarizing each of the articles we draw attention to the different themes that they address 
and how they exhibit the central characteristics of genealogy: diversity, complexity and 
contestation. 
The articles by Katharyne Mitchell and Fernanda Nicola address the influence of 
scientific rationalities and elite narratives on social impact investing and the negotiations of the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Mitchell’s article investigates the 
contingent origins of measuring social value in the rapidly expanding area of social impact 
investment. She demonstrates that assumptions regarding the scientific validity, neutrality and 
transparency of social metrics legitimize new forms of governance. In particular, social impact 
investing is used to nudge governments and the targets of investment (i.e., the needy) toward 
market oriented solutions, one effect of which is to further sideline the state as a guarantor of 
social provision. Mitchell’s research sheds light on the contingent origins of many of the ideas 
that underpin social impact investing, such as ‘best practices’ and ‘evidence-based policy’. These 
ideas originate with influential philanthropic actors like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 
and celebrity humanitarians like U2’s Bono further disseminates such ideas by connecting 
policy-makers, financiers and philanthropists. Mitchell’s highlights the social scientific concepts 
and global network of elites that have given rise to the newest variant of philanthro-capitalism: 
social impact investing. 
In her article, Fernanda Nicola investigates the difficulties of achieving EU-US 
regulatory cooperation in negotiating TTIP. She contends that existing theories of international 
regulatory cooperation and analyses of TTIP provide incomplete accounts of why EU and US 
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negotiators have repeatedly clashed over regulatory cooperation. She demonstrates that 
agreement has been difficult in part because of the influence of different cost-benefit traditions 
on the negotiating positions of the two parties. Whereas the EU adopts the perspective of 
‘institutional proportionality’, the US approach is influenced by ‘law and economics’. Nicola’s 
article traces the contingent origins of these two traditions and demonstrates how diverse 
understandings of cost-benefit have influenced TTIP negotiations. 
Emma Carmel’s study of EU social policy and security policy highlights the contingent 
and politically contested origins of knowledge production and expertise. Carmel challenges a 
commonly held belief amongst EU scholars that expertise is best conceptualized as a neutral 
resource that gives those who possess it power over others in the policymaking process. Drawing 
on Foucault’s notion of power/knowledge, Carmel demonstrates that expertise is itself the effect 
of power relations. In doing so, she draws attention to the ways various individuals and 
organizations participate in the production of expert knowledge about the EU and the governance 
policies and practices such knowledge informs. 
William Walters’ article addresses how the activities of EUROSUR, the EU’s border 
surveillance system, are organized around the concept of ‘situational awareness’. Walters 
research demonstrates that EU border control and policing embodies an emergent political 
rationality, whose peculiarities are missed if we approach EUROSUR as a problem-solving 
initiative or locate it as a case of the general phenomenon of securitization. Building on 
Foucauldian-inspired genealogies of security, including some of his own work, Walters argues 
that governance of the EU’s southern border involves the production of a new temporality and 
spatiality. Within the framework of EUROSUR, there is a quest to produce real-time knowledge 
of border spaces – or ‘situational awareness’ – to enable immediate, coordinated responses to 
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migration and border policing – what Walters labels ‘live governance’. Walters traces the diverse 
origins of situational awareness and demonstrates how it is implicated in material and 
technological practices of producing and securing the EU’s southern border. In doing so, he 
denaturalizes what is emerging as taken for granted understandings about what the EU’s border 
is an how it needs to be managed. 
 Finally, our article details more fully our understanding of the genealogical approach and 
investigates some of the elite narratives that contributed to democratic reforms contained in the 
Treaty of Lisbon. We argue that post-Maastricht (1993), the European Council, the European 
Parliament and the European Commission identified managing public opinion as a central 
purpose of treaty reform. The institutions publicly worried that a rising tide of Euroscepticism 
amongst the public threatened the functioning of the EU and endangered future plans. In this 
context, the institutions turned to improving the democratic character of the EU as a means to 
counter public opposition and increase public support for the EU. That is, the institutions turned 
to democracy as instrument of system maintenance. Agreement on the end (system 
maintenance), however, did not guarantee agreement on the means (democratic reform). The 
institutions made different and conflicting proposals regarding how to enhance the democratic 
character of the Union. We claim that key differences amongst the institutions’ visions of a 
democratic Europe can be explained by relating them to three long-standing traditions in 
European governance: nationalism, federalism and technocracy. In the end, the Lisbon Treaty 
contained proposals and mixtures of proposals from each of the institutions. By exploring the 
diverse origins of the Lisbon reforms, our article underlines the contingent and contested nature 
of EU democracy. 
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Conclusion 
This Special Issue demonstrates the usefulness of the historical investigation of ideas for the 
study of European governance. Whereas existing governance research provides descriptions of 
general patterns, the articles of this Special Issue provide explanations of why some patterns 
exist. In particular, each of the articles sheds light on the influence of social scientific concepts, 
elite narratives and local traditions on the ways Europe is governed. In doing so, they draw 
attention to the contingency and diversity of ideas that are used to govern Europe. 
In concluding this introduction, we want to suggest two implications of our historicist and 
humanist approach for a research agenda on European governance.  
Several commentators have suggested that ‘scientific progress’ in the study of EU 
governance requires a conceptual debate that will settle the definition of ‘governance’ (Kohler-
Koch and Rittberger, 2006: 43; Olsen, 2009: 192–193). If the point is that a settled definition 
will ease communication amongst researchers, we see nothing objectionable about trying to 
establish common usage. Alternatively, EU scholars might embrace Rhodes’ (1996) suggestion 
to employ adjectival terms – e.g., multi-level governance, network governance, regulatory 
governance or experimental governance – to clarify distinct uses. However, given that the call 
for conceptual uniformity has emanated from researchers committed to the project of developing 
comprehensive, progressively scientific theories of European governance, we think that this 
desire carries a false promise. It is assumed that if researchers worked with a single definition of 
governance that referred to a single phenomenon, then more concentrated effort could be put 
towards specifying the common conditions or factors that produce European governance and its 
effects. Our understanding of the social logic of European governance, so the argument goes, is 
being obstructed by conceptual ambiguity and conflicting definitions.  
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Alternatively, we think that the term governance names a variety of contemporary 
practices in Europe. Moreover, as we have argued European governance does not contain a 
social logic. As such, conceptual uniformity will not facilitate discovery of an underlying social 
logic of European governance. Instead, researchers should define their terms clearly in reference 
to those policies or practices they think they capture and develop genealogies of the ideas that 
have brought those policies or practices into existence.  
Secondly, in our view too much effort has been put into trying to identify the essence of 
EU and its predecessors: is it an intergovernmental organization? Or a supranational functional 
polity? Is it sui generis or comparable to national political systems? Answers to these questions 
have then been the basis for choosing amongst modernist social scientific theories and methods. 
Of course, there are patterns of activities. But given that what the EU is is the result of what EU 
actors do, ideal theorizations threaten to occlude the practical nature of the EU. Instead, research 
should be directed at the rationalities and narratives that inform actors’ practices. Rationalities 
are the webs of belief that inform the actions of those we study. Our explanations of their actions 
should be oriented toward revealing a consistency between the beliefs they hold and the practices 
that they engage in. Our explanations of their beliefs should take a narrative form. Because 
governance practices – like all political action – is explained by reference to the beliefs that 
actors’ hold, we should be interested in how those we study came to hold those beliefs and not 
others. In terms of research, this suggests developing historical narratives about the origins of 
beliefs. The contributions to this Special Issue are examples of how this can be done. 
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Table 1 Comparison of Governance Research 
 Multi-Level 
Governance 
Network Governance Regulatory 
Governance 
Experimental 
Governance 
Definition The involvement of 
public actors at 
different territorial 
levels in policy-making 
Policy-making through 
the interaction of public 
and private actors 
Sustained and focused 
control by EU agencies 
over activities that are 
socially valued 
A recursive process of 
provisional goal-setting 
based on learning from the 
comparative assessment of 
different policies 
 
Significance 1.!State executives lose 
monopoly on 
domestic interest 
mediation 
2.!State executives lose 
policy-making 
control 
 
1.! Policy segmentation 
2.! Dominance by 
experts 
1.!Supranationalization 
of regulatory policy 
2.!Dominance by 
experts 
1.!Difference from 
governmental hierarchy 
2.!Policy coordination in 
politically sensitive 
areas 
Explanatory Factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.!Scale of collective 
problems 
2.!Expansion of 
national policy 
objectives 
3.!Policy and political 
benefits of 
supranational 
delegation 
4.!Interdependence 
5.!Geopolitical rivalry 
 
 
1.! Shared legitimacy 
beliefs 
2.! Entrepreneurship by 
the Commission 
3.! Subnational groups 
4.! Transnational 
lobbying 
5.! Supranational law 
1.!Privatization of state 
industries 
2.!Interdependence 
3.!EU fiscal constraints 
4.!Entrepreneurship by 
Commission 
5.!Policy credibility 
1.!Polyarchic distribution 
of power and 
interdependence 
2.!Strategic uncertainty  
  32 
Areas of 
research/debate 
1.!Breadth and depth 
2.!Changing role of 
state actors 
3.!Role of non-state 
actors 
4.!Nature of activity 
5.!Europeanization 
1.! Influence of national 
and supranational 
actors 
2.! Domestic interest 
mediation 
3.! Extensiveness 
4.! Effects on national 
patterns of 
governance 
1.!Variation in 
regulatory powers 
2.!Influence of different 
actors 
3.!Political 
accountability 
4.!Europeanization vs. 
nationalization 
1.!Effectiveness of OMC 
2.!Impact on national 
policies 
3.!Openness to actors 
4.!Transitional mechanism 
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i That said, it would be misleading to claim that governance research enacted a clean break with 
the subfields of comparative politics or International Relations. It was scholars within CP and IR 
that produced original articulations of the idea of governance and identified some of the 
problems that public actors faced (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006, 2009: 4–11; Pollack, 2005: 
380). It would be more accurate to say that researchers on European governance broke with 
statist traditions in CP and IR (Caporaso and Wittenbrinck, 2006: 471–473). We should add that 
our review of the literature is limited to publications in English. 
ii Theorists of experimentalist governance treat it as both an empirical theory and normative 
ideal. Our interest is in the former. 
iii This section draws on (Phillips, 2015). 
iv In fact, John Peterson views MLG as one species of network theory (2004: 126–127). 
v This narrative is based on Majone 1994 and 1999. Elsewhere, Majone refers to additional 
factors: American ideological influence, institutional isomorphism and shifting priorities of 
European governments (1996: 47–56). 
vi For a view on the study of Europeanization that overlaps with our perspective on European 
governance, see Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford’s book Rethinking Europe: Social Theory 
and the Implications of Europeanization. We would like to thank one a reviewer for this 
reference. 
vii Even when existing research on European governance gives a nod to the importance of ideas 
(Kohler-Koch, 1999; Majone, 1996: 49–54) it often remains confused about ultimate causes, 
often suggesting ideas are epiphenomena whose ultimate cause lay elsewhere.  
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